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Abstract: We experimentally test whether a class of monetary policy decision rules describes
decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, sub-
jects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with in°ation as
their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control in°ation. We ¯nd that
Taylor-type rules ¯t the choice data well, and are instrumental in characterizing heterogene-
ity in decision making. Our experiment is the ¯rst to begin to organize data experimentally
with an eye on monetary policy rules for this, one of the most widely watched and analyzed
decisions in economics.
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laboratory.1 Introduction
The importance of monetary policy decision rules, which are frameworks within which cen-
tral banks are committed to make their decisions, has grown rapidly over the last decade. A
purpose of adopting such rules is to provide central bankers with more e®ective and robust
monetary policy (through better and more stable actions) and to help the public better un-
derstand central banks' actions (through better transparency of those actions). The growing
importance of monetary policy rules is apparent when one considers the amount of research
conducted in this area (e.g., Taylor 1999a and Bernanke and Woodford 2005), and the in-
°uence of this research on policy makers.
There has been an active debate about whether monetary policy is better conducted
by pursuing targeting rules or instrument rules (e.g., Svensson 2003 and McCallum and
Nelson 2005). In°ation targeting is an example of a targeting rule, which involves a public
commitment by the central bank to a policy for an in°ation rate. Recently several central
banks have adopted in°ation targeting, and indeed the recent nominee for chairmanship of
the Federal Reserve in the United States, Ben Bernanke, is an advocate of such a monetary
policy rule.
The Taylor rule (Taylor 1993), which linearly maps the in°ation gap (the di®erence
between in°ation and a given in°ation target) and output gap (the di®erence between output
and potential output) into the central bank's instrument (say, the short-term nominal interest
rate), is an example of a simple instrument rule.1 Substantial research has been done in
investigating whether the Taylor rule is an accurate description of central bank's behavior
(see Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1998), and the Taylor rule has inspired very active theoretical
research of the properties of simple policy rules such as optimality and robustness (see
Svensson 1997, Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999).
From a historical perspective, the Taylor rule provides a useful framework to examine
1 Such a decision rule speci¯es the central bank's instrument as a function of central bank's information.monetary policy over time. Using this approach, Taylor (1999b) assesses several periods in
history of U.S. monetary policy, identi¯es turning points in monetary policy, and quanti¯es
the size of past mistakes as well as the degree of e®ectiveness of di®erent policy rules. John
Taylor provides the following summary for this research (see Taylor 1999a): simple policy
rules behave nearly optimally and are more robust than complex rules.
In this paper, we present a new use for Taylor-type rules: as a tool for describing how
inexperienced economic agents attempt to achieve a target level of in°ation in a computer
economy. In our economics experiments, inexperienced `central bankers' are asked to conduct
monetary policy in a laboratory to maximize `social welfare', which is directly related to their
payo®. The model economy is such that a Taylor-type rule is optimal (more speci¯cally,
in this model in°ation targeting leads behaviorally to a Taylor-type rule). Our question
is whether Taylor-type rules describe decision making of subjects in this environment. If
so, then we take a step forward understanding how people come to understand a central
bank decision-making problem, we strengthen the argument that the Taylor rule is useful
in communicating central bank policy, and we begin to organize choice data collected in
controlled experiments on monetary policy.
For concreteness, let us brie°y discuss the policy rules we study. The simplest Taylor-type
rule is
it = °0 + °1(¼t ¡ ¼) + °2 xt;
where it is the central bank's instrument chosen at time t, ¼t is the in°ation rate, ¹ ¼ is a given
in°ation target, xt is the output gap (the di®erence between log-output and log-potential
output). The coe±cients °1 and °2, i.e., the weights placed on in°ation and output, are
positive. Taylor suggested it = 4 + 1:5(¼t ¡ 2) + 0:5xt in his original paper. The optimal
monetary policy in our models has either this form or has in addition a lagged in°ation gap
term:
it = °0 + °1(¼t ¡ ¼) + ^ °1(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼) + °2 xt:
2In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the discount rate in two simple economies in
which Taylor-type rules are optimal. The experiments provide a tough test of the theory:
the subjects did not know they were controlling an economy, nor did they know the speci¯c
equations governing the dynamics of the system. Nevertheless, we ¯nd that Taylor-type
rules, with an additional term for smoothing, explain a signi¯cant share of the variance of
the data, particularly when we ¯t them on a subject-by-subject basis. In other words, we
¯nd in our laboratory study that linear rules are useful for describing behavioral outcomes
in a central bank problem with in°ation targeting.
Perhaps most importantly, as mentioned in Taylor (1999c), it is important to have the
in°ation response coe±cient °1 larger than 1 (`stability threshold').2 Most of the subjects
in our experiments successfully learn to get this right: the estimated °1 is just above 1. By
contrast, the estimate for the unsuccessful subjects is less than 1. We go on to show that the
primary incentive in the model is to achieve exactly that: despite the fact that the optimal
solution calls for a higher weight on in°ation, there is little increase in expected payo® for
doing so. Our study is the ¯rst to identify Taylor-type rules as good descriptions of the
behavioral outcome when subjects try to achieve an in°ation target.
In practice, monetary policy rules may be di±cult to infer from central bank decision
making for a variety of reasons. For example, Judd and Rudebusch (1988) note that the
in°ation target is not observable to the econometrician, causing it to be lumped in a re-
gression constant when estimating the coe±cients of the rule. Also, central bankers react
to di®erent data than are available to the econometrician: the data sets commonly used
to identify decision rules contain revisions that were not available to the central bank at
the time they set their instrument (Orphanides, 2001). Finally, there are multiple ways to
measure potential output in an economy. None of these di±culties are present in laboratory
data, providing the cleanest test we can think of for the decision rule.
2 Taylor attributes a better monetary policy in the 1980s and 90s to °1 being above 1 as opposed to the
1960s when it was below 1.
3There have been at least two other related studies of central bank decision making in the
laboratory. Arifovic and Sargent (1999) ¯nd that policy makers can ¯nd ways to achieve a
time-inconsistent optimal in°ation rate in an expectational Phillips curve model. In their
experiment policy makers set the in°ation target and consumers report in°ation expectations.
Blinder and Morgan (2004) study the advantages of committee decision making in a problem
more similar to ours: their question is whether groups or individuals identify and respond to a
shock to money demand better. Our study may shed additional light on these existing results
by speci¯cally studying the decision rules that subjects use while determining monetary
policy.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 The macroeconomic model
We ¯rst consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with money and nominal price rigidity.
Like in the Keynesian IS-LM approach, monetary policy a®ects the real economy in the short
run. However, like in the new classical approach, equations for aggregate variables are derived
from the optimization problems of households and ¯rms. As a result, economic behavior in
the current period depends on expectations of the future monetary policy.
The model has two aggregate equations:
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ b(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ut; (1)
¼t = a1Et¼t+1 + a2xt + vt: (2)
The ¯rst equation indicates a negative relationship between the output gap xt and the
expected real interest rate it ¡ Et¼t+1 (it is sometimes referred to as an \IS" curve). It is
obtained by log-linearizing the household Euler equation. The second equation is a Phillips
curve that shows a positive relationship between in°ation and the output gap. It can be
4derived from an environment of monopolistically competitive ¯rms. The equation is obtained
by log-linearizing around the steady state of the aggregate ¯rms' pricing decision.
Now we slightly generalize this model to allow for persistence:
xt = q(xt¡1) + (1 ¡ q)Etxt+1 ¡ b(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ut; (3)
¼t = r¼t¡1 + (1 ¡ r)a1Et¼t+1 + a2xt + vt: (4)
We added a lagged output gap to the ¯rst equation and a lagged in°ation to the second one.
We justify this adjustment on the basis of empirical observation (see Fuhrer, 1996), and on
the basis of theoretical work on adjustment costs. The addition of lagged in°ation to the
second equation can be justi¯ed by introducing adaptive expectations into the model. In
the particular case of q = 1 and r = 1 we obtain the backward-looking model studied in
Svensson (1997). This type of model does not take into account agents' responses to changes
in policies, and thus assumes that the model parameters do not change as policy changes.3
The advantage is the great simpli¯cation of the analysis obtained by treating the private
sector's expectations as an adaptive process. After some arrangements we can obtain the
following model:4
xt+1 = ¯1xt ¡ ¯2(it ¡ ¼t) + ºt+1; (5)
¼t+1 ¡ ¼ = ®1(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼) + ^ ®1(¼t¡1 ¡ ¹ ¼) + ®2xt + ²t+1: (6)
In general, the coe±cients ®2 and ¯2 are assumed to be positive, and all others are nonneg-
ative; in addition, ¯1 < 1. In this economy, in°ation is serially correlated and increasing
in lagged output. Output is serially correlated and decreasing in the lagged short-term real
3 We can usefully think of our model as analogous to a long line of models in experiments in Industrial
Organization, in which human subjects set prices in a game against computer robot buyers. In these
experiments, the goal is to learn as much as possible about seller behavior by isolating it apart from the
buyers. In our experiment, we wish to learn as much as possible about the policy maker, and we plan to add
human consumers in future work.
4 For more details about this kind of models, see Clarida, Gali Gertler (1999), Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,
1995b), Ball (1997).
5interest rate it¡¼t. In this dynamic economy ¹ ¼ is the long-run in°ation rate and the long-run
output gap is zero (when optimal monetary policy is pursued).5











where ¹ ¼ is the in°ation target.
The central bank's policy rule can be written as
it = °0 + A(L)¼t + B(L)xt;
where A(L) and B(L) are lag polynomials (note that we surpress ¼ hereafter). The lower
the degree of the polynomials A and B the `simpler' is the policy rule. As was mentioned
before, the optimal policy rules in our models have the following form:
it = °0 + °1 ¼t + ^ °1 ¼t¡1 + °2xt;
where ^ °1 = 0 if ^ ®1 = 0.
2.2 The Experimental Design
We ran two versions of the model. In Model 1 only the ¯rst lag of in°ation a®ects current
in°ation (^ ®1 is zero), and in Model 2 we distribute the e®ect of in°ation over an additional
lag. For Model 1 we used Weymark's (2004) coe±cient estimates of the Canadian economy,
rounding down ¯1 to ease the demands of tricky dynamics on our subjects. We chose these
coe±cients because we wanted the system dynamics to be somewhat consistent with a real
5 Our model generalizes Svensson's model, in which in°ation is assumed to have a unit root. In Svensson's
model in°ation and output are increasing in an exogenous variable, which provides a potentially interesting
addition for further study.
6economy, and we wanted to leave the door open for future study of open economy issues.
The coe±cients are presented in Table 1. We set both the potential level of output and the
long-run in°ation rate at 5.00, we set the in°ation target at 5.00 and we always started the
system in the steady state.
It can be shown that the optimal solution for Model 1 is a Taylor-type rule, and for
Model 2 a linear rule that adds non-zero weight to the ¯rst lag of in°ation. The optimal rule
for Model 1 is:
it = 5:00 + 3:22¼t + 1:87xt; (8)
and the optimal rule for Model 2 is:
it = 5:00 + 5:00¼t + 0:533¼t¡1 + 1:60xt: (9)
While we did not expect subjects to apply optimal weights to the relevant variables, our
design does make the following testable predictions: (1) from Model 1 to Model 2, the
relative weight on in°ation should increase, and (2) in Model 2 but not in Model 1, non-zero
weight should be placed on the ¯rst lag of in°ation.
For inexperienced subjects, this is a very di±cult decision-making problem. Imagine you
are balancing a broom with the handle in the palm of your hand and the broom head up
in the air. The location of the head of the broom is analogous to in°ation and the location
of your hand the instrument; your target is a vertical broom. Now imagine the head of the
broom starts to move away from you (i.e., in°ation increases past the target). You must
move your hand past the physical location of the broom head to bring it back towards you
(i.e., you must set the instrument higher than the rate of in°ation), and as the broom moves
towards you, you must bring your hand back with it (i.e., you must reduce the instrument as
in°ation nears the target). It is not obvious that the feedback subjects receive while playing
the game will be as useful as the visual feedback one receives balancing the broom.
72.3 Experimental Procedures
Our design presents a tough test for Taylor-type rules, because it does not allow subjects to
bring prior information about monetary policy to bear on their decision making: subjects
were not told the decisions they were making had anything to do with the economy, and
they were not shown the equations driving the system.6 Instead they were presented with
\chip levels in two containers labelled Container A and Container B", told that the levels
were related to each other and the instrument, that increasing the instrument would tend to
lower the chip levels, and that each period the relationships were computed and randomness
was added to each chip level. Container A actually corresponded to output and Container
B to in°ation. The goal was to keep the chip level in Container B (i.e, in°ation) as close
to 5.00 as possible. Subjects were told that the relationships would not change during the
entire session, and that the randomness was independent and identical in each period.
Upon arriving at the experimental laboratory, subjects were seated in front of a computer
screen. Their decision-making consisted of entering a number for the instrument with up to
two decimal places, and clicking an ok button. The screen revealed the entire history of the
game, including all past realizations of in°ation, output, and all past instrument values. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
Subjects were able to practice the game for no pay before playing it once for pay (as in the
schooling choice problem in Houser, Keane, and McCabe, 2004). The practice sessions were
set up so that there were ¯ve 10-period games, followed by two 25-period games, followed
by 50-period games. Subjects were told that they could practice as often as they liked, with
the limitation that the lab was booked for an hour and a half. If subjects wished to play
the game for pay after practicing only 10-period games, we suggested they try at least a
25-period game ¯rst to improve their chance of earning money; performance in 10-period
games is not a good predictor for 50-period games because it may take longer than 10 periods
6 The informational conditions were similar to those in Blinder and Morgan (2004).
8to lose control of the system. When they did play the game for pay, subjects were told that
all the rules and relationships remained the same, except that the game for pay would last
either 51 or 52 periods, and that they would not be told which.7 To the subjects in every
session, either outcome was equally probable; this breaks up an end-game strategy, and we
only analyze data up to ¯fty periods. All subjects in both treatments experienced exactly
the same shocks in the game for pay, which were drawn from the normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation 0.15 using the random number generator in Ox (Doornik,
2002).
We paid subjects using a scheme similar to that used in Arifovic and Sargent (1999).
This procedure communicates earnings when the earnings depend on a loss function.8 Each
period, a subject's loss was converted to \period points" (say, Pt) by adding 0.10 to the
computed loss. For subjects who were doing reasonably well, this transformed the period's
result into a positive number. The subjects earnings (say, E) were $25.00 times the ratio of






It can be shown that this payo® scheme provides the same incentive as minimizing losses.
Thus the maximum theoretical earnings for decisions were $25.00, if no losses ever occurred.
We have discovered through practice that it is possible to earn $23.00. Although earnings
may be displayed as negative, subjects never earned less than the show-up fee. The display
presented the period loss, period points, and the earnings that would be made if the current
period were the last period of play.
We ran the experiments at the Bell University Laboratory in Electronic Commerce and
7 For programming purposes we °ipped a coin before the ¯rst session and used that result to run 52-period
games.
8 The quadratic loss function seems di±cult to understand for at least two reasons: (1) it is relatively
°at whenever in°ation is close to the target and (2) during the entire session, the loss function constantly
provides only negative feedback regarding subjects' performance.
9Experimental Economy in Montreal in the winter term of 2004. The subjects earned a $10.00
show-up fee (which covers the cost of public transportation to travel to the lab, which is not
located on campus, for many of our subjects). Sixty-eight subjects participated with Model
1 earning an average of $26.68, and seventy subjects participated with Model 2 earning an
average of $26.60, including the show-up fee. Subjects varied by the amount of practice
games they played, and were paid and dismissed as they ¯nished. Each subject played at
her/his own pace. Sessions did not last beyond an hour and a half. We analyze only the
games for pay.
2.4 Discussion of the Experimental Design
Our experiment presented the subjects with a rather di±cult decision-making problem. In
fact it surprised us when we ran our initial sessions that few learned how to control in°ation,
thus we had to learn how to conduct our experiments in such a way that we could collect
meaningful data. Based on our experience with two pilot sessions we modi¯ed the design
in the following ways. The data, which simply told us whether a reasonable proportion of
subjects were able to make non-negative earnings, are available upon request.
First, we switched from modelling in°ation with a unit root to the Canadian economy
coe±cient estimates; with the unit root subjects could not control the system. Second, we
decreased the standard deviation of the shocks from 0.25 to 0.15. Third, we simpli¯ed our
instructions and added a brief reference section for easy look-up during the session. And
fourth, we made learning quicker by building up the number of rounds slowly in the practice
part of the session from ten to twenty-¯ve to ¯fty.
At ¯rst we were concerned that we had oversimpli¯ed the design, but the results suggest
otherwise. In Model 1 only ¯fty-six out of sixty-eight subjects successfully controlled the
system, and ¯fty-eight out of seventy did so in Model 2.
103 Results
Figure 1 shows the time series of in°ation, output gap, and instrument choice if the central
bank uses the optimal rule in Model 1 in our experiments. This simulation is valid for every
subject because every participant experienced the same sequence of shocks in the games for
pay. The ¯gure shows that it is possible to limit in°ation (the solid line) between 4.5% and
5.5% by selecting instrument values roughly in the range from 4 to 6.
[insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Figure 2 show the same series for Model 2. The more complicated dynamics require a
slightly wider range of instrument selection, but again one can see that in°ation can be kept
within a very narrow band of control. Due to the way we distributed the lagged e®ect of
in°ation and due to the identical sequence of shocks, one can also glean from the two ¯gures
that when optimally controlled, the time path of in°ation is similar in both models.
Despite the fairly low variance in the shocks (0.15) there is still plenty of scope for
monetary policy. Figures 1 and 2 show that to optimally control the system the instrument
must vary between roughly 3.75 and 6.25 for Model 1, and between 3.0 and 6.5 for Model
2. Thus the decision-making problem requires the subjects to use an active strategy for
controlling the economy, i.e., the problem is not a trivial one.
Sixty-eight subjects played the game with Model 1 driving the system, and of these ¯fty-
six made nonnegative earnings (negative earnings were converted to zero earnings). The
mean sum of period losses (std. dev.) for the successful subjects was 1.15 (0.98), and for
the unsuccessful ones was 551.18 (1821.87). If one were to use the optimal rule total losses
would be 0.57; thus the successful subjects performed very well.
Seventy subjects played the game with Model 2 driving the system, and of these ¯fty-eight
made nonnegative earnings. The mean sum of period losses (std. dev.) for the successful
11subjects was 1.03 (0.89), and for the unsuccessful ones was 579.49 (1783.72). If one were to
use the optimal rule total losses would be 0.57; thus, again, the successful subjects performed
very well.
3.1 Individual Results
We found it rather fun to look at the time path of decision making of some our potential
future central bankers. Figures 3 - 6 present selected results from four individual subjects.
Figure 3 presents a very successful subject who kept in°ation almost within the narrow
band of optimal control; perhaps a committee nomination is in his or her future. Figure 4
shows the decisions of a subject who began to lose control in the middle of the game but
seemed to be regaining it. Around period 24 this subject continued to decrease the level of
the instrument even while in°ation began to increase. At period 27 the the subject moved
the instrument above the in°ation level and eventually brought it back down. The smaller
in°ation peak at period 42 shows the subject regaining control in a skilled manner. Maybe
we should consider bringing this person in someday to troubleshoot a stormy economy.9
[insert Figures 3-6 here]
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate what can happen when control is lost. Figure 5 shows the
decisions of a subject who makes very small changes in the instrument for 15-20 periods,
then as in°ation begins to decrease, decreases the instrument for too long, following with
sharp increase in the instrument, then a sharp decrease, and ¯nally another sharp increase.
By contrast with Figure 4, this subject experienced wider swings over time and the future
does not look promising. Figure 6 shows the decisions of another subject who made very
small changes for more than 25 periods and apparently did not know what to do with the
instrument as in°ation constantly decreased.
9 Unfortunately, anonymity requirements make it impossible to identify these two promising individuals.
12Figures 7 - 10 present selected results from four individual subjects experiencing Model 2.
Figure 7 shows another example of very tight control, and Figure 8 shows a recovery. Figure
9 presents an interesting simple threshold decision rule: when in°ation dropped below a
threshold, the subject sharply lowered the instrument to bring in°ation back up toward
the target. S/he returned the instrument to the initial value and held it there, apparently
waiting for another threshold to be exceeded. Figure 10 is an example of loss of control due
to waiting too long to move the instrument and then not moving it enough.
[insert Figures 7 - 10 here]
3.2 Aggregate Results
Our data contain ¯fty decisions for over ¯fty subjects in each treatment, thus we begin our
analysis with panel data estimation. We must take care doing this for two reasons. First,
our prior was that the decision to set the instrument in period t would be a®ected by the
decision that was taken in period t¡1, either because of inertia or a taste for smoothing on
the part of the subjects. In this case one must instrument for the lagged dependent variable
on the right hand side of the equation. Second, if coe±cients are heterogeneous with respect
to individual subjects, imposing the restriction of homogeneity can result in severely biased
estimates. We address these issues one at a time in the following analysis.
We ran a ¯xed e®ects panel regression for both models on the data from the successful
subjects.10 Table 2 presents the results, located in the column labelled \Fixed E®ects".
We estimated an equation with the instrument as the dependent variable and the following
10 Eliminating the unsuccessful subjects from the analysis primarily biases the coe±cient estimate on
in°ation upward with respect to the randomly drawn subject population. We must remove these subjects
because once they lose control of the process they are constrained: the optimal strategy is not available to
them any more because we limited the range of the instrument, thus our analysis is conditional on successful
control. We believe this is not a problem because in real life we typically observe decisions made by people
who have an understanding of the process. We also note that there was an obvious breakpoint between
successful and unsuccessful performance.
13independent variables: lagged instrument, in°ation, lagged in°ation, output, and lagged
output. We present results from this general model; none of the conclusions we make are
a®ected by reasonable changes to the the set of independent variables.
These regressions provide some evidence that the lagged instrument a®ects decision mak-
ing, with positive and signi¯cant coe±cients on the lagged instrument. The estimate of the
critical coe±cient, i.e., the coe±cient on in°ation, is 1.10 for Model 1 and 1.00 for Model
2, and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for both; this coe±cient should be greater than 1 to
achieve control of the system. The coe±cient on output is positive and signi¯cant in both
models. And the coe±cients on lagged in°ation and output are negative and signi¯cant in
most cases. The r-squared statistics for these models is in the 0.40 - 0.50 range, indicating
that there is quite a bit of variance of decision making left to explain.
Since the lagged dependent variable might be a part of the e®ective strategy that subjects
employ, we re-estimated the same model instrumenting for this variable using the one-stage
Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure. This procedure uses all available lags of the lagged
dependent variable as instruments for it. The results are presented in the second column of
Table 2 labelled \Arellano and Bond".
All coe±cients for both models, except lagged output in Model 2, are signi¯cant in these
regressions. Once again, the lagged dependent variable appears to a®ect decision making in
both models, though with a larger coe±cient in Model 2 than in Model 1. Estimates for the
coe±cient on in°ation are a bit greater than 1 for both models, and positive weight is placed
on output for both models. What is striking is that the weights on the important variables,
i.e., in°ation and output, appear nearly identical in both cases. Recall also that Model 2
calls for positive weight on lagged in°ation but the subjects appear to be placing negative
weight on it instead.
Our earlier discussion suggested the existence of heterogeneity among our subjects, so we
present results relaxing the restriction of homogeneity of the coe±cients of the decision rule.
14Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest estimating the coe±cients individually and aggregating the
estimates in this case, thus we ran OLS regressions on a subject-by-subject basis estimating
the same model we reported in Table 2. We report the results in Figures 11 - 15.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of r-squared statistics for both models. Notice that the
horizontal axis labels the higher of the numbers de¯ning each bin. For example, in Figure
11, Model 1, there were 25 r-squareds that fell between 0.90 and 1.0. Both distributions are
concentrated in the range above 0.60, the mean of both distributions is approximately 0.80,
indicating a much better ¯t than we found with the panel regressions. Figure 12 presents
the distribution of estimated coe±cients for the lagged instrument, and here we ¯nd similar
results for both models with a modal estimate around 0.16, and means of 0.14 and 0.17 for
Models 1 and 2, which is smaller than the panel data estimates but still positive. By far
most of the estimates lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 13 shows how individual subjects reacted to in°ation. A clear majority of subjects
in both treatments acted as though they placed a weight greater than 1 on in°ation. The
mean coe±cient estimates are 1.07 and 1.10 for the two treatments. Figure 14 shows the
distribution of estimated weights on the lagged in°ation coe±cient; the means here are close
to zero and once again the distributions are similar. Figures 15 and 16 present estimated
coe±cients for output and lagged output; once again, the distributions are similar, with
positive mean weight placed on output and roughly zero mean weight placed on its ¯rst lag.
The means of the estimated coe±cients on output are 0.17 and 0.21 for Model 1 and Model
2, which is lower than the optimal rule coe±cients.
Four things struck us with the results of the individual regressions. First, the ¯t of the
OLS regressions was high, with averaged r-square statistics of 0.80. Second, the means of
OLS estimates of the coe±cients told the same general story as the estimates in the panel
regressions. Third, the distributions of the estimates of the coe±cients were similar across
the two treatments; so similar, in fact, that we thought we had put together the histograms
15incorrectly at ¯rst. And fourth, these distributions of the OLS estimates look very di®erent
from what a sampling distribution of OLS estimates would look like in a sequence of repeated
experiments with the same structure (i.e., asymptotically normal and resemblance to normal
in a small sample). This last point bolsters the notion that the subjects are not all the same.
3.3 Discussion of the Results
We simulated our two models of the economy to understand the incentives faced by our
inexperienced central bankers. For the ¯rst of these simulations we assumed the central
bankers target in°ation, i.e., they keep their eye only on container B while setting their
instrument, placing zero weight on all other variables. We thought this a good starting
point because it is reasonable for a subject with no experience to ¯xate on the container
that determines her payo®, and because many subjects told us in post-experiment protocols
(which were announced after the experiment and were voluntary) that they focused on
Container B.
We varied the weight on in°ation from 0.50 to 5.0 in increments of 0.10, averaging the sum
of the period losses incurred by the central banker over 10,000 simulations of the economy.
The result for Model 1 is presented in the top panel of Figure 17. The horizontal axis is the
weight on in°ation in the decision rule (with all other weights zero), and the vertical axis
presents the expected payo® in Canadian dollars. The ¯gure reveals that the payo® function
is steep for weights on in°ation less than 1.0, and then it °attens out for weights up to 3.0.
The top panel of Figure 18 shows a similar situation for Model 2. Thus there is a strong
incentive to get the weight just above 1.0.
Next we took the decision rule coe±cients from the data, using the mean estimate for
all variables except in°ation, which we varied from 0 to 4.5. The results for Model 1 and
Model 2 are presented in the middle panels of Figures 17 and 18. Once again the payo®
function is steep roughly until the weight on in°ation surpasses 1.0 and then °attens out.
16The ¯gures show the locations of the means of the estimated OLS coe±cients from the data,
which were 1.07 for Model 1 and 1.10 for Model 2. Both means are located near where the
payo® function levels o®, at the top of the steep part for weights less than one.
Then we repeated the exercise varying the coe±cient on output from 0 to 2.9 while
holding all the weights on all other variables constant at the mean of the OLS coe±cients.
These results are in the lower panels of Figures 17 and 18. These panels reveal that the
payo® function is °at with respect to changes in the weight given to output. All expected
payo®s in this range are above $20.
How much better could the subjects have done with the optimal rule? In Model 1, the
expected payo® for the mean of the estimated rules is $20.93 vs. $21.50 for the optimal
rule. In Model 2, the expected payo® for the mean of the estimated rules is $21.38 vs. $21.9
for the optimal rule. Clearly not much is being lost for playing what we conjecture to be
a heuristic, with attention primarily focused on in°ation, with a bit of short-term interest
weight smoothing, and with sub-optimal weight on output.
Our conjecture is that subjects used a simple heuristic, which performed nearly as well
as the optimal rule, to solve this problem. To investigate the possibility that the successful
subjects climbed just to the top of the hill while the unsuccessful ones did not make it o®
the steep part of the hill, we ran a regression on the ¯rst 25 decisions of the unsuccessful
subjects in both economies.11 We found a mean weight of 0.30 on in°ation in Model 1,
and a result statistically insigni¯cant from 0 for Model 2. While we cannot say for certain,
and neither can our subjects, it appears plausible that learning in this environment involves
climbing the part of the payo® function where the weight of in°ation is less than one.
While there is general agreement among macroeconomists that the weight placed on
in°ation must be greater than 1.0, there is less agreement as to how high above 1.0 the
weight should be. Our results thus illustrate that in our models a wide range of decision-rule
11 We limited this analysis to the ¯rst 25 decisions to avoid problems with constrained decisions that
occurred after a loss of control.
17parameters do nearly as well as the optimal rule, as long as the weight is just above 1.0.
The incentive is to get the weight on in°ation over 1.0, but beyond that there is not enough
incentive to perfect the rule.12 Our results also illustrate the ¯nding that Taylor-type rules
are instrumental in characterizing heterogeneity in decision making of inexperienced central
bankers in our two computer economies.
4 Conclusion
We infer Taylor-type linear decision rules from the observed choices of inexperienced central
bankers in the experimental laboratory where we know the details of the macro economy.
Since we know the details of the economy, we bypass the typical problems in practice inferring
monetary decision rules, such as unobservable in°ation targets, ex-post revised macro data,
and di±culties measuring an economy's potential output. In our experiments subjects set
the short-term interest rate with in°ation as their target. The results suggest that a linear
decision rule ¯ts a large portion of the variance of decisions of subjects who learned how
to control in°ation, particularly when we ¯t decision rules to each subject individually,
and when we include a term for smoothing. We ¯nd little di®erence in behavior between
experimental treatments despite apparent success in controlling the computer economies.
Our results showed that our successful bankers, on average, achieved an apparent weight
of something very close to 1 on in°ation, while our unsuccessful bankers achieved a weight
of less than 1. We illustrated the fact that the primary behavioral incentive for bankers in
this problem is to get the weight of in°ation just above 1, and that there is little incentive to
achieve a weight higher than that. We found that Taylor type rules, when they control for
behavioral tendencies such as smoothing, are an excellent tool to get at the heterogeneity in
this decision-making problem.
12 Houser, Keane, and McCabe (2002) made a similar ¯nding in a dynamic decision problem mimicking
the choice of schooling.
18We do not suggest that our experiments provide evidence that central banks use Taylor-
type rules, but we believe that we have taken a step in the direction of learning how inexperi-
enced economic agents react in environments that model important issues in macroeconomics,
and learning what rules are behaviorally relevant in such environments. To the extent that
communication and transparency are important for central banks, our results suggest that
linear rules can be a valuable means of communication, since they explain behavior by peo-
ple in the extreme case where they know little about the process. We found that in°ation
targeting induced behavior that was explained well by linear decision rules. And as in the
long line of experiments in IO, where inexperienced ¯rms set prices, we begin to organize
the data in the simplest of environments that we use to understand important policies.
Our study provides a foundation for exploration of a variety of issues in monetary eco-
nomics. An obvious next step is to determine the parameter or set of parameters that induce
di®erent decision rules for di®erent economies. We plan to add the exogenous variable to
study behavior when exchange rates, interest rates, or output in other countries a®ect the
economy. Indeed we can study the e®ect of central bank decision making in one country
on another, with the ability to insert an optimal decision maker as a control in one of the
economies. While we ran our ¯rst study using a simple backward-looking model, it will be
important to test models in which economic agents react to the central bank's decision rule.
Our experiment establishes a baseline result, suggesting that Taylor-type rules are useful for
describing the behavior of inexperienced central bankers.
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21Coefficient Description Model 1 Model 2 Weymark
α1 First Lag Inflation on Inflation 0.50 0.20 0.4964
α1
^ Second Lag Inflation on Inflation 0.00 0.30 -
α2 First Lag Output on Inflation 0.15 0.15 0.1324
β1 First Lag Output on Output 0.90 0.90 0.9386
β2 First Lag Instrument on Output 0.75 0.75 0.7311
Table 1: Coefficients for Models 1 and 2 Based on Canadian EconomiyModel 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lagged Instrument 0.41* 0.51* 0.45* 0.60* 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Inflation 1.10* 1.00* 1.11* 1.09* 3.22 5.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Lagged Inflation -0.20* -0.53* -0.15 -0.41* 0.00 0.53
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Output 0.24* 0.15* 0.35* 0.37* 1.87 1.60
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Lagged Output -0.07 0.16* -0.12* 0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 0.06
R-sq 0.41 0.49
Notes: Model 1: 56 subjects, 49 observations per subject
           Model 2: 58 subjects, 49 observations per subject
Pooled Regression Results
Fixed Effects Arellano and Bond Predicted
Table 2: Panel Regression Coefficient EstimatesFigure 1: Model 1 Simulation Using The Optimal Rule Figure 2: Model 2 Simulation Using The Optimal Rule





























InstrumentFigure 4: Increasing Variance Over Time Figure 3: A Very Good Central Banker

































InstrumentFigure 6:A Lost Cause Figure 5:Losing Control

































InstrumentFigure 7: Another Very Good Central Banker Figure 8: A Recovery





























InstrumentFigure 9: A Simple And Effective Rule Figure 10: Another Lost Cause





























































































































































































































































































































































































































yFigure 17: Expected Payoffs for Model 1











































































































































Mean of OLS Estimates: 1.07
Mean of OLS Estimates: 0.17Figure 18: Expected Payoffs for Model 2































































































Mean of OLS Estimates: 1.10





































Mean of OLS Estimates: 0.21